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INTRODUCTION
A case can be "underrated" for several reasons. One type of underrated
case is the "big" case that the conventional wisdom considers to have been
wrongly decided. In constitutional law, for example, some scholars might
consider Lochner v. New York' to be underrated, in that they believe the
case to be correct, or at least not as wrong as the conventional wisdom has
it. But right or wrong, the case is "big" in that it has come to stand for a
fundamental principle of law--even though there is disagreement as to
what that fundamental principle is. 2 Under this theory, underratedness is
measured by "correctness," with the case's importance taken as a given.
* Associate Dean for Faculty and Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles.
Thanks to Yavar Bathaee, Carlos Chait, and Marie Claire Tran for fine research assistance.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner-Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) (setting forth
different understandings of Lochner).
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Professors Weaver and Jellum's contribution to this forum,3 defending an
unquestionably "big" case, SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery il), 4 reflects
this conception of underratedness.
Another way to think about underratedness is to focus on small cases,
those that do not explicitly stand for or are generally not thought to stand
for grand principles. Such small cases might be underrated if, properly
understood, they do in fact stand for something fundamental. Under this
theory, underratedness is measured not just (or even primarily) by
correctness, but by the case's actual importance. Indeed, if the case
confronts a fundamental tension in the law, then it should be thought of as
having some intrinsic importance. Even if its resolution of that tension is
incorrect, a case still might be useful-and thus potentially underrated-if
its error has the effect of pointing towards the correct path.
I offer a pair of candidates for most underrated case: Patel v. INS' and
Ford Motor Co. v. FTC.6 These two Ninth Circuit cases consider the limits
of agencies' concededly broad discretion to proceed via adjudication as
opposed to rulemaking. These cases are closely related: Patel applies a
principle, which I call the "anti-circumvention" principle,7 on which Ford
Motor then expands. Patel's limits on agency procedural discretion fit
neatly with the substantive rule that agencies may not ignore their own
regulations. For this reason, Patel is correctly decided.
But Patel is underrated. Compared with Ford Motor, it is far less
discussed by commentators 8 and courts, 9 and the principle it announces
may suffer by association with Ford Motor's more aggressive-and
ultimately incorrect-variant. Patel deserves more attention. By stating an
exception to the general rule that agencies can choose between rulemaking
and adjudication, Patel stakes out the limitations of that rule. In
3. Russell Weaver & Linda Jellum, Chenery II and the Development of Federal
Administrative Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 815 (2006).
4. 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (Chenery I1).
5. 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980).
6. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981).
7. See William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the
Limitations of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 397 (2000) (using this terminology).
8. See, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 115-
17 (1993) (devoting three pages to Ford Motor and its progeny, but citing Patel only in
footnotes); CHARLES H. KOCH, WILLIAM S. JORDAN III & RICHARD W. MURPHY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 160-62 (5th ed. 2006) (excerpting Ford
Motor but not mentioning Patel). But see Magill, infra note 69, at 1408 n.87 (citing Patel as
a rare example of a court invalidating an agency's reliance on adjudication instead of
rulemaking).
9. In the last ten years, only one appellate court has cited it for anything close to the
principle which qualifies it, in my view, as underrated. See Pfaffv. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 748
(9th Cir. 1996) (setting forth Patel as a situation where the agency's reliance on adjudication
amounted to an abuse of discretion).
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delineating the extent of agency discretion, Patel makes an important
contribution to administrative law, and thus qualifies as an underrated case,
both for being "correct" and "important."
For its part, Ford Motor's expansion of the anti-circumvention principle
is ultimately incorrect; thus, I am not arguing that Ford Motor is underrated
because it was correctly decided. 0 However, the heavy criticism of Ford
Motor"1 is unbalanced by a recognition of the case's usefulness. Ford
Motor takes Patel's anti-circumvention principle to its logical endpoint. In
doing so, it reveals the limits of that principle and illustrates important
truths about the role of procedure in administrative law. Its attempt to
apply basic administrative law principles, while ultimately misfiring, does
not warrant one-sided criticism. While incorrect, Ford Motor deserves
more credit than it gets.
Part I of this Article lays out Patel and Ford Motor, and the eventual fate
of the anti-circumvention principle in the Ninth Circuit. Part II defends
Patel, and places it within the fabric of other administrative law doctrines.
Part III briefly discusses Ford Motor. It does not defend Ford Motor's
result, but explains the case's importance in illuminating the outer limits of
agency discretion to choose its policymaking vehicle. It also argues that,
ultimately, Patel and Ford Motor can be visualized as standing close to
each other, but nevertheless on opposite sides of the line separating
acceptable and unacceptable uses of agencies' discretion on this issue. If
nothing else, the usefulness of these two cases in illuminating that line
warrants more attention to these cases and increased consideration at least
of Patel.
I. ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Patel dealt with an agency's discretion to choose between rulemaking
and adjudication as its regulatory vehicle. Common wisdom indicates that
an agency has wide, though not complete, discretion to make this choice.
1 2
This Article presumes the reader's familiarity with the basic doctrine and
provides here only a brief framework.1 3 The Court recognized agencies'
10. This conclusion reflects a reconsideration of views I had previously expressed. See
Araiza, supra note 7, at 398-99 (defending Ford Motor).
11. See, e.g., I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 384 (4th ed.
2002) (placing Ford Motor in a category of cases that "announce limits on agency discretion
that would produce havoc if they were applied to all agencies," and describing these cases as
"wrongly decided"); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 301 n. 142 (4th ed. 2004) (describing Ford Motor as
"almost certainly ... an aberration," and noting the ABA's criticism of it).
12. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (explaining that agencies
must enjoy significant discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication); NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (holding that the choice between rulemaking
and adjudication lies within the administrative agency's discretion).
13. For a detailed discussion of the cases discussed in this paragraph, see Araiza, supra
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discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication nearly sixty
years ago in Chenery 1/.14 In Chenery II, the Court conceded that
consistency and notice concerns counseled in favor of agencies taking more
advantage of rulemaking, but it also noted the sound practical reasons that
might lead an agency to choose instead to proceed via case-by-case
adjudication. Chenery II recognized that agencies were in a better position
to consider those practicalities and, thus, gave the agency broad deference.
Twenty years later, the waters muddied somewhat. First, in NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co.,' 5 the Court held that the NLRB essentially had
engaged in a rulemaking when it structured an adjudicatory process to
allow broad input from third parties and when the resulting order was
broadly applicable and purely prospective. As explained below, Wyman-
Gordon can be read as attempting to police the procedural and substantive
distinctions between rulemaking and adjudication, even while respecting
agencies' discretion to choose between the two. Its force was blunted,
however, by the unusual combination of votes that produced its holding.1
6
Five years later, in Morton v. Ruiz, 17 the Court reversed an agency action,
using language that could be taken to require agencies to use rulemaking
procedures when the action taken has significant impact on vulnerable
groups.18 Ruiz's suggestion is exceptionally vague but, read broadly, it
could impose significant limits on agencies' discretion to choose between
acting by rulemaking and acting by adjudication.
This period of heightened judicial scrutiny of agency choices of its
preferred regulatory vehicle largely came to an end only two months after
Ruiz. In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,' 9 the Court reaffirmed Chenery II's
statement that agencies enjoy broad discretion in this area. At the same
note 7, at 359-68.
14. 332 U.S. at 202-03 (announcing the principle that agencies have broad discretion to
choose between rulemaking and adjudication).
15. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
16. The line-up in Wyman-Gordon requires a brief explanation. Justice Fortas, writing
for himself and three other justices, concluded that the order the agency relied on for
support, issued in an administrative adjudication in a case called Excelsior Underwear, was
invalid as a de facto rule that was not promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act's (APA) rulemaking procedures. Id. at 764-65. On this issue, the plurality was joined
by Justices Harlan and Douglas. Id. at 775-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 780-83
(Harlan, J., dissenting). But the plurality also concluded that the order in Wyman-Gordon
itself could stand, as a valid instance of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) setting
policy by adjudication because, according to the plurality, it would be useless to remand the
case to the agency to re-decide a policy issue it had already decided. Id. at 766 n.6. The
affirmation of the order against Wyman-Gordon also constituted a majority, as Justice
Black, writing for himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall, concluded that the Excelsior
order was valid and thus provided support for the agency's action in Wyman-Gordon. Id. at
772-73.
17. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
18. Id. at 235-36.
19. 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
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time, however, it warned that this discretion might be abused and, thus, left
a door open for judicial review of an agency's choice. Bell Aerospace's
abuse of discretion standard has become the settled law.
Patel marked the beginning of a jurisprudence in the Ninth Circuit that
attempted to apply that abuse of discretion standard by locating the limits
of agency discretion. Commentators 20 and courts21 generally focus on the
1981 Ford Motor case when discussing the Ninth Circuit law on this issue.
As befitting the topic of underrated cases, academic and judicial
commentary on Ford Motor, and the principle it enunciated, has been
almost uniformly negative.22 But, Patel, which preceded Ford Motor,
provides the first real glimpse of the Ninth Circuit's developing
jurisprudence.
A. The Beginning: Patel
23
In Patel, the court considered an Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) adjudicatory decision denying an alien's request for a discretionary
suspension of deportation. The alien, Patel, based his request on his status
as an investor in a U.S. business, as allowed by INS regulations
promulgated in 1973. The agency determined, however, that Patel had not
satisfied the "investor exemption," reading into it a requirement that the
investment "tend to expand job opportunities" in the United States.24 In so
holding, the agency relied on an earlier adjudication-In re Heitland25-
that had established the job creation requirement. The problem was that the
Heitland decision had interpreted an earlier version of the investor
exception regulation and had only stated in dicta that the then-recently
promulgated 1973 regulation also included a job creation requirement.26
Thus, the situation confronting the court in Patel paralleled that in
Wyman-Gordon. In Wyman-Gordon, the agency had first established a
legal principle during an adjudicatory proceeding (in a case called
Excelsior Underwear27) and then used that earlier proceeding as authority
20. See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 275 (3d ed. 1994) (focusing on Ford Motor).
21. See, e.g., Stotler v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 855 F.2d 1288, 1294 (7th
Cir. 1988) (citing Ford Motor as the basis of petitioner's argument); Colorado Dep't of
Soc. Servs. v. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 585 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D. Colo. 1984)
(referring to Ford Motor as novel and provocative case law); New York Ear and Eye
Infirmary v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 396, 406 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (explaining the criticism
of the Ford Motor case).
22. See supra note II and accompanying text (providing examples of legal scholars'
criticism of Ford Motor).
23. This exposition of Ninth Circuit case law draws heavily on my earlier article,
Araiza, supra note 7, at 398-99.
24. Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980).
25. 14 1. & N. Dec. 563 (BIA 1974).
26. Id. at 564-65.
27. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
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for the adjudicatory order handed down in Wyman-Gordon.28  But, as those
familiar with Wyman-Gordon will recall, the Court found something
inappropriate about the adjudicatory format by which the Excelsior rule
was established. In particular, the problem was that, in the Excelsior
litigation, the agency had followed a quasi-rulemaking procedure (most
notably, it had invited participation by third parties) and had given the
resulting order purely prospective effect (not applying the order against
Excelsior itself because it deemed that step unfair, given that the order was
laying down a new substantive rule of conduct).29 Moreover, the rule in
Excelsior-that an employer had to turn over to a union a list of all the
eligible employees' addresses-was not limited to the particular facts of
that case, but rather was a generally applicable rule of labor relations law.
Similarly, in Patel, the problem was with the status of Heitland order as
pure dicta "prospectively pronounc[ing] a broad, generally applicable
requirement, without then applying that requirement to aliens seeking
exemptions under the 1973 regulation."30 Thus, in Patel, just as in Wyman-
Gordon, the agency was reversed for relying on an adjudicatory precedent
that was somehow insufficiently "judicial."
But the Patel court did not stop at the parallel to Wyman-Gordon by
merely refusing to accept the agency's reliance on the Heitland dicta.
Instead, it went on to question the appropriateness of promulgating any job-
creation requirement through adjudication. The court first noted that the
agency had considered inserting such a requirement into the proposed rule
that eventually became the 1973 regulation, but after public comment had
eliminated the requirement. 31 It also noted that regulations promulgated
subsequent to Patel's application (and thus not applicable to his case) had
included a job creation requirement.3 2  Because the agency had first
tentatively, and later conclusively, utilized the rulemaking process to
establish the job creation requirement, the court concluded the issue did
not, by its nature, require case-by-case resolution. Thus, the court
concluded, the case fell outside of Bell's admonition that certain issues had
to be decided by adjudication because of their fact-specific character.33
The court then concluded its analysis by noting two issues that would
become important in later Ninth Circuit case law. First, it found a notice
problem in the agency's inconsistent conduct in the period before Patel's
28. See 394 U.S. 759, 761-62 (1969) (setting forth the facts).
29. Id. at 765.
30. Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1980).
31. Id. at 1202.
32. See id. at 1205 (noting that the regulation was amended to include the job-creation
criterion in 1976).
33. See id. ("In contrast [to the situation in Bell], the job-creation criterion ... does not
call for a case-by-case determination. It may be stated and applied as a general rule even
though the result may vary from case to case.").
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application for suspension of his deportation; namely, withdrawing the job-
creation criterion from its proposed 1973 regulation but then "obscurely",
34
adding the requirement by means of dictum in the Heitland decision.
Second, the court noted the severe hardship Patel would face, given the
extreme liberty-impairing quality of deportation.35
Patel laid the analytical groundwork for subsequent Ninth Circuit
jurisprudence. First, the court relied on its conclusion that the agency's use
of adjudication to establish the job creation requirement impermissibly
"circumvent[ed], 36 both prior and subsequent rulemaking processes. This
approach is different from Ruiz's more aggressive suggestion that certain
issues by their very nature required rulemaking. In contrast to Ruiz, Patel's
approach rested on the agency's own initial and ultimate decisions to use
rulemaking. In addition to this procedural flaw, the court found a more
fundamental problem in the agency's resolution of this issue by
adjudication, since the agency's own conduct suggested that the rule was
capable of being stated in a general regulation. Finally, the court noted the
burden retroactively imposed on the regulated party, and the party's lack of
notice of the rule. All of these concerns ultimately found their way into the
developing Ninth Circuit case law.
B. The Development: Ford Motor
In Ford Motor,37 the Ninth Circuit continued to develop its limitations on
agency discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication. Ford
Motor considered a challenge to a Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
adjudication against the Ford Motor Company and a Ford dealership in
Oregon concerning accounting practices they employed to calculate the
value of repossessed cars.38 The agency brought these charges while it was
involved in a rulemaking process aimed at regulating closely related
practices employed by the same classes of businesses.
39
The court disallowed the agency's use of adjudication to attack those
practices. Relying on Patel, the court framed the issue as whether the
adjudication "change[d] existing law, and ha[d] widespread application.'4°
The court first rejected the agency's argument that the defendants'
practices violated Oregon law. It noted that the relevant Oregon statute
was part of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), but that the agency had
not cited a single case from any UCC jurisdiction that interpreted the Code
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1980).
37. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. Id. at 1008.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1010.
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to prohibit the challenged practices. 4' The court then noted the general
applicability of the legal principle emerging from the adjudication. It
observed that the UCC provision on which the agency based its charge
existed in forty-nine states and that the agency was preparing to notify car
dealerships across the nation of the decision, presumably to inform them of
the new requirements to which they would be held.42 The court's
conclusion reflected this concern by using adjudication to achieve industry-
wide changes, while at the same time expressing concern over the fact that
the agency was involved in a pending rulemaking on related issues:
To allow the order to stand as presently written would do far more than
remedy a discrete violation of a singular Oregon law as the FTC
contends; it would create a national interpretation of UCC § 9-503 and in
effect enact the precise rule the FTC has proposed, but not yet
promulgated.
43
C. The Limiting and Solidifying of Ford Motor
Subsequent Ninth Circuit opinions have read Ford Motor as preserving
agency discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication. Still,
the rule that has emerged imposes potentially significant limitations on that
discretion. In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC,44 decided one year after
Ford Motor, the court considered an adjudication-derived legal principle
that the agency claimed was based on its interpretation of an existing
regulation. The court, however, believed it necessary to consider whether
that interpretation was instead a de facto amendment to the rule, in which
case, according to the court, the agency would have to resort to the normal
agency rulemaking process.45 In the court's view, "an adjudicatory
restatement of the rule becomes an amendment... if the restatement so
alters the requirements of the rule that the regulated party had inadequate
notice of the required conduct., 46  In deciding this issue, the court
compared the text of the regulation to the standards announced in the
adjudication. 47 The court also examined "the agency's prior use of rule-
making and the current adjudication to see if the agency's conduct in the
latter is consistent with the proceedings in the former., 48
41. See id.
42. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1981).
43. Id.
44. 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982).
45. See id. at 1329 (stating that an amendment is proper only when adequate notice is
provided to affected parties pursuant to appropriate rulemaking procedures).
46. Id.
47. See id. (explaining that the court looks at the extent the standards applied in the
adjudication vary from the plain language of the rule when deciding if the agency decision
was an abuse of discretion).
48. Id.
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The two factors considered in Montgomery Ward have become the basis
of current Ninth Circuit law. In Cities of Anaheim v. FERC,49 the court
explicitly identified "two exceptions qualify[ing] [the] general proposition"
that "[a]dministrative agencies are free to announce new principles during
adjudication."5  "First, agencies may not impose undue hardship by
suddenly changing direction, to the detriment of those who have relied on
past policy."5 Second, "agencies may not use adjudication to circumvent
the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking procedures. 52 In rejecting
the plaintiffs' claim that the agency should have been required to act by
rulemaking, the court seemed to cast doubt on the broader rule enunciated
in Ford Motor:
The cities, seizing upon broad language in Ford Motor Co .... argue that
any agency principle of general application that changes existing law
must pass through formal rulemaking procedures. Even if this were an
accurate statement of the law, FERC's clarification of its suspension
policy in [a prior adjudication] was a minor adjustment, a fine tuning of
doctrine that does not require rulemaking unless it imposes severe
hardship or circumvents existing rules. By contrast, Ford Motor Co.
involved a new interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code that
would have changed long-standing creditor practices.
53
Thus, while distinguishing Ford Motor on its facts, the Cities court
appears to have narrowed its potentially broad sweep by applying its test
more cautiously. This Cities analysis has been cited by subsequent courts
and appears to have become the generally accepted rule in the circuit.5 4
The Ninth Circuit's more circumspect approach to the agency's
rulemaking-adjudication decision also is evident in the results of the cases;
since Ford Motor, the court has refrained from striking down adjudications
on the ground that the agency should have proceeded instead by
rulemaking.55
II. THREE CHEERS FOR PA TEL
Despite its obscurity and the criticism leveled at its anti-circumvention
rule, Patel and the anti-circumvention principle it spawned deserve respect
49. 723 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 659.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (internal citations omitted).
54. See, e.g., Union Flights, Inc. v. FAA, 957 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
Cities as authority regarding when an agency circumvents the requirements of the APA);
Coos-Curry Elec. Coop v. Jura, 821 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting language from
Cities); Weight Watchers v. FTC, 830 F. Supp. 539, 542-43 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (applying
the rationale of Cities).
55. See supra text accompanying note 53 (describing the Ninth Circuit's application of
Cities).
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on their merits as an important statement of law and as an illustration of a
central tension in administrative law. That is, Patel's analysis is both
"correct" and "important," as this Article uses those terms as criteria of
underratedness.
The anti-circumvention principle, as applied in Patel, is correct. In
Patel, that principle requires that the agency remain faithful to its own
choice of policymaking forum. Nothing in Patel dictates or restricts the
agency's initial choice between rulemaking and adjudication. Thus, Patel
does not disturb the settled law dating back to Chenery IL However, Patel
does limit agency discretion in an important way: It requires that an
agency, once having made the choice that a given issue is amenable to
rulemaking, not abandon that process.
This modest limitation on agency discretion protects the integrity of the
Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) rulemaking processes. As implied
by Wyman-Gordon, rulemaking procedures matter; once a court determines
that the product of the procedure is in fact a rule, an agency cannot use any
procedure it wishes to promulgate it. It follows that an agency cannot
avoid those procedures simply by claiming that it is not really producing a
rule. In Wyman-Gordon itself, for example, the Court decided that the
Excelsior decision upon which the agency was relying was in fact a rule,
despite the agency's argument that it was simply a policy-setting
adjudication. This insight necessarily means that courts must have a
conception of what a rule is. Thus, in Wyman-Gordon, the Court
invalidated the agency's reliance on Excelsior because, in the Court's view,
the Excelsior order had taken the form of a rule (because it was generally
applicable and purely prospective), but the agency did not use the
mandated rulemaking procedures.
Wyman-Gordon's attempt to distinguish rules from orders, while
seemingly compelled if the goal is to protect the rulemaking process,
nevertheless presents a paradox. Adjudicative and rulemaking procedures
often feature similar characteristics, and orders and regulations often have
similar effects. Agencies often invite (or at least allow) third parties to
submit their views on an issue in an adjudication. They also often issue
adjudicative orders that impose generally applicable rules-indeed, this
almost follows the black-letter principle that agencies can "set policy"
through adjudication. Thus, the only difference between these everyday
adjudications and the Excelsior adjudication invalidated in Wyman-Gordon
was that, in the Excelsior proceeding, the agency attempted to protect the
regulated party from the unfairness of imposing on it a new rule.56 But
56. See, e.g., Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The plurality [in
Wyman-Gordon] did not prohibit agencies from announcing principles by adjudication
which may later govern agency actions as precedent.... Rather, the Court forbad agencies
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protecting a regulated party from unfair surprise hardly seems a good
reason to invalidate the otherwise unremarkable process that took place in
Excelsior, especially when the surprise may not be apparent to the agency
when it commenced the adjudication."
For our purposes, however, we do not need to go as far as Wyman-
Gordon did when it attempted to determine whether an agency action was
really a "rule." If we assume that the agency already has embarked on a
rulemaking process, then a court does not need to determine for itself the
nature of the agency's action. Rather, the agency itself has made that
determination by commencing a rulemaking. Moreover, with the agency
having decided to act by rulemaking, even more danger to the integrity of
the rulemaking process exists when the agency attempts to switch its
policymaking vehicle. Thus, in such cases, there is much more reason to
hold the agency to its choice of that process.
This more limited protection for the integrity of the rulemaking process,
in which judicial protection is triggered only after the agency itself has
made a commitment to rulemaking, is what the court provided in Patel.
Patel could have rested its holding on the ground that the job-creation
requirement was a de facto amendment to the INS regulation.58 But,
instead, as explained above, the court analogized its situation to the one in
Wyman-Gordon, with the Heitland dicta playing in Patel the role the
invalid Excelsior order played in Wyman-Gordon. In particular, Patel
focused on the broadly applicable and purely prospective nature of the
Heitland dicta upon which the challenged order in Patel rested. As with
the Excelsior order, the Heitland dicta was invalidated as procedurally
flawed.
The crucial difference between Wyman-Gordon and Patel is that the
Excelsior order painted on an essentially blank regulatory canvas, while the
Heitland order was issued against the backdrop of an existing regulation.
Thus, the Wyman-Gordon Court had to take the more extreme step of
labeling Excelsior a rule, even in the face of the agency's argument that
Excelsior was simply another in its long line of policymaking adjudicative
from promulgating a 'rule,' which the APA defines as 'an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect... ,' in an adjudicative proceeding. It was the
prospective pronouncement of a broad, generally applicable requirement, without
application of the requirement to the parties before the NLRB in Excelsior, which the Court
deemed improper in Wyman-Gordon.") (internal citations omitted).
57. To deepen the paradox, severe surprise may be grounds for refusing to allow an
agency to impose an adjudicative result on the target of the enforcement action. See Araiza,
supra note 7, at 372-76, 387-91 (describing the author's views on denial of "procedural"
notice, denial of "substantive" notice, and the retroactivity problem).
58. Indeed, a previous Ninth Circuit case had so concluded; however, that earlier case
ultimately rested its holding on the unfair surprise Heitland had imposed on the individual.
See Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39, 45 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that Heitland did not
provide the necessary notice to Ruangswang).
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orders. 9 By contrast, Patel simply could point out that a regulation already
existed and that the agency ultimately amended that regulation through the
notice and comment process. Thus, Patel could take the more moderate
position that once the agency went down the rulemaking path, it could not
abandon it without another rulemaking.6°
On reflection, it becomes clear that Patel's principle is nothing more
than the procedural reflection of the substantive rule that an agency
regulation binds the agency as well as outside parties, unless and until the
agency revises that regulation.61 These substantive and procedural
requirements are tightly linked; indeed, it may not be an overstatement to
characterize them as mirror images. The character of agency regulations as
binding not just on private parties but on the agency itself62 would not mean
much if the agency could alter a regulation whenever the target of an
enforcement action alleged that the agency was violating it. Conversely,
the procedural requirements for rulemaking would be easily evaded-
indeed, "circumvented"--if the agency could change an agency regulation
through a means short of another rulemaking-for example, issuing a
purported interpretive regulation (which does not require the notice and
comment process) or changing it in an adjudication. Of course, agency
regulations cannot be expected to answer every regulatory issue that might
arise-hence the need for interpretative regulations and adjudications, even
when an agency has promulgated a legislative regulation. But properly
understood, an interpretive regulation does not imply an alteration of the
substance of the regulation. 63 Patel suggests the same for adjudications
construing a regulation.
59. Recall that until recently the NLRB was well known for making policy almost
exclusively through adjudications. See generally Robinson, infra note 71, at 512 (noting the
NLRB's reliance on making policy through adjudications).
60. For example, a rulemaking that rescinded the prior rule and announced that
subsequent policy would be made by adjudication.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1956) (finding
that the Federal Communications Commission regulations under consideration bound the
broadcaster and would continue to bind respondent until modified); Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. FLRA, 777 F.2d 751, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[W]hile
an adjudication can overrule an earlier adjudication, the Administrative Procedure Act
clearly provides that a rule can only be repealed by rulemaking."). Some commentators
have explicitly linked the process rule stated in Patel and the substantive rule that an agency
is bound by its own regulations. See, e.g., L. Harold Levinson, The Legitimate Expectation
that Public Officials Will Act Consistently, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 549, 564 (Supp. 1998) ("The
adoption or the repeal of a rule is defined as rulemaking; therefore, an agency must use the
rulemaking process in order to adopt or repeal rules. Thus an agency is bound by its own
rules unless the agency repeals them or a higher authority intervenes.") (internal citations
omitted); see also Russell L. Weaver, Challenging Regulatory Interpretations, 23 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 109, 121 n.48 (1991) (collecting cases suggesting this connection).
62. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining that regulations bind the
agency as well as outside parties).
63. Id.
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Under Patel it is the agency's original decision to promulgate a
regulation that triggers the requirement that it stick with that path-for
example, that it not announce subsequent changes in an adjudication. So
understood, Patel's rule parallels how some courts have gone about
determining whether a regulation is legislative or interpretive. The
rulemaking-adjudication and legislative-interpretive rule issues pose a
common challenge to courts: They both require courts to make difficult
determinations that carry significant procedural consequences for agencies.
When distinguishing between legislative and interpretive rules, courts have
often relied heavily on the agency's own characterization of the challenged
action.64  Reliance on the agency's own labeling makes sense, as both
labels carry costs and benefits for the agency. Legislative rules are difficult
to promulgate, but they become binding law. Conversely, interpretive rules
are easier to promulgate. However, because they are not legally binding,
an agency's decision to characterize its action as a mere interpretation
carries costs for the agency, as it will be forced to litigate the
appropriateness of that policy every time it initiates an adjudication. As I
have argued elsewhere, "[b]ecause description of a statement as something
less than a substantive rule thus has real costs for the agency, there is at
least some reason for a court to defer to an agency-imposed label. 6 5
A similar rationale applies when a court requires an agency that has
chosen rulemaking to continue down that path rather than to deviate to
adjudication. Agencies enjoy many benefits when they choose to proceed
by rulemaking. A rule applies to all affected parties, and has the force of
law without the agency having to litigate its wisdom in case after case.
Moreover, after United States v. Mead Corp. ,66 the product of a notice and
comment rulemaking enjoys a greater chance of earning Chevron deference
than does a statutory interpretation reached in the course of an informal
adjudication.6 7 At the same time, using rulemaking to address a regulatory
problem carries costs for the agency. Most notably, the process itself may
be onerous, and the agency will be cabined in its ability to deviate from the
regulation that is ultimately promulgated-it can, of course, deviate, but
68
only by promulgating an amendment or rescission.
64. See Araiza, supra note 7, at 399 n.256 (citing to cases that stand for the proposition
that an agency's characterization is a factor).
65. Id. at 399.
66. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
67. Indeed, the consequences of an agency interpretation not being accorded Chevron
deference include not only the presumably lesser level of deference suggested by the default
Skidmore standard, but also the greater unpredictability inherent in that standard. See id. at
240, 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the unpredictability of Skidmore deference).
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (confirming the principle announced in
Patel that the agency's decision to promulgate a rule binds both the agency and the outside
community).
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Thus, both of these limits on the agency's discretion to abandon notice
and comment rulemaking respect the agency's discretion to make the initial
choice to embrace that process. There is good reason for this similarity. In
the legislative rule-interpretive rule issue, aside from a small set of easy
cases, there is a paucity of judicially manageable criteria by which courts
can determine whether the alleged interpretive rule really does just interpret
existing law or whether it establishes a new standard of conduct. Similarly,
in most cases, courts are less able than agencies to determine whether a
given regulatory problem is more susceptible to rulemaking as opposed to
adjudication. At the same time, in both situations the agency faces both
benefits and drawbacks in choosing either option. Thus, in both cases it
makes sense for the agency to possess the discretion to make the initial
choice, as long as the agency is then held to the procedural consequences of
that choice.
In the context of the anti-circumvention principle, the choice that carries
consequences is the choice to attack a particular regulatory problem by
promulgating a regulation. Once the agency goes down the rulemaking
path, it should be viewed as having committed itself to the procedural
requirements of rulemaking. Thus, the consequence of choosing the
rulemaking path is that the agency should not be able to alter the substance
of that rule through a process less elaborate than a rulemaking.
Patel therefore can be seen as the procedural reflection of the substantive
rule that an agency is bound by its own regulations. Further, because the
agency already had promulgated a rule, Patel is less aggressive than
Wyman-Gordon, which attempted to identify the abstract nature of a rule.
In contrast to Wyman-Gordon, Patel respects agency discretion as long as
the agency lives with the consequences of its choice of regulatory vehicle.69
For these reasons Patel seems correct70 and fits snugly against other
administrative law principles.
It may seem that Patel is obvious and, for that reason, trivial. If all it
stands for is the procedural flip-side of an uncontroversial substantive rule,
then what is its significance? But Patel reveals an important linkage
between procedural and substantive requirements on agencies. It
illuminates the substantive law link to the requirement that the agency
respect the rulemaking process, while at the same time according agencies
69. Of course, since courts review whether agencies followed the appropriate
procedures for the chosen regulatory vehicle, they can always attempt to influence the
agency's choice by varying the strictness of the judicial review to correspond with the
court's sense of whether the agency made an appropriate choice. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1431-34 (2004)
(describing Magill's views on how the courts can shape the administrative process).
70. See, e.g., id. at 1412 (explaining as a basic understanding of Chenery H the concept
that "agencies may select their form [of proceeding], but they may not design it").
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appropriate deference to make the initial choice between rulemaking and
adjudication. Its analysis is more satisfying than Wyman-Gordon's, which
attempted to identify the Platonic form of a rule as a predicate to requiring
the agency to follow the APA's rulemaking process. Of course, a court
may find it easier to deal with a case in which the agency already has acted
through rulemaking, as in Patel, than one in which the agency has not yet
committed itself to rulemaking, as in Wyman-Gordon.71 But even if the
court in Patel had an easier task than the Court in Wyman-Gordon, the fact
remains that its analysis marks an intersection between two fundamental
principles: agency procedural discretion and the binding nature of agency
procedural rules. This makes the case important. The lack of attention
paid to it-and, even more importantly, the criticism Patel may have
suffered by association with the case that extended it a step too far-Ford
Motor-justifies calling Patel a truly underrated case.
III. ONE CHEER FOR FORD MOTOR
The more difficult question is posed by Ford Motor. In Ford Motor the
circumvention of the rulemaking process occurred not after the rulemaking
was complete, as in Patel, but rather during the pendency of the rulemaking
process. Because there was no extant regulation from which the agency
adjudication deviated, Ford Motor cannot be seen as the procedural flip-
side of the substantive rule that regulations bind the promulgating agency
until the agency changes them: In Ford Motor there was no regulation
binding the agency.
At the same time, Ford Motor does reflect Patel's purely procedural
concerns about an agency abandoning its earlier choice to proceed by
rulemaking. Ford Motor's facts are troubling in that the agency was
attempting to impose via adjudication a generally applicable and seemingly
new rule that was the subject of a concurrent rulemaking process. One can
intuitively understand why the court was concerned about the agency's
attempt to proceed down two tracks at the same time. It is difficult to
justify deferring to the agency's choice of policymaking forum when the
agency seems not to have made a choice. Further, a participant in the
pending rulemaking justifiably might wonder if the agency's adjudicatory
71. Indeed, the facts in Wyman-Gordon were even more egregious, in that the agency
(the NLRB) was well known for having always eschewed rulemaking in favor of setting
policy by adjudication. For this reason the Court in Wyman-Gordon may have felt
especially strongly about labeling Excelsior a rule and rebuking the agency's argument that
Excelsior was a run-of-the-mill adjudication. See, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, The Making of
Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative
Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 512 (1970).
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choice and planned notification of all car dealers across the nation had
prejudged its position in the rulemaking even more than an agency
necessarily does when it announces a proposed rule.72
The problem with Ford Motor's more aggressive use of the anti-
circumvention principle is that it clashes with Chenery II's recognition of
the real world problems faced by agencies, and the deference properly
accorded agencies to respond to those problems. Read aggressively, Ford
Motor could be understood as prohibiting agencies from using
adjudications to take interim actions during the pendency of a rulemaking
on that subject. Such a result might be troublesome. Given how long
rulemaking takes, a prohibition on interim agency actions on that same
topic-even a narrower prohibition on an agency announcing a new legal
principle in the course of an adjudication conducted during a rulemaking-
could arguably cripple an agency's ability to deal with a new and urgent
problem. The risk that the pendency of a rulemaking would stop the
agency from proceeding in the interim through adjudication might well
convince the agency to completely avoid the rulemaking. This additional
restriction on rulemaking would add to the phenomenon of procedural
requirements making rulemaking less desirable to agencies. Doctrinally, if
Ford Motor's prohibition on adjudication-based policymaking during the
pendency of a rulemaking were understood as a procedural restriction on
the rulemaking process itself, it might violate the spirit of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp, v. Natural Resources Defense Council.73
Leaving the Vermont Yankee concern aside, it may be overstating the
problem to fear that Ford Motor's anti-circumvention rule cripples an
agency's ability to respond quickly to a problem while simultaneously
promulgating a regulation as a long-term solution.74 Today, if an agency is
concerned that the pendency of a rulemaking might preclude an interim
response, it can invoke the good cause exception to the notice and comment
procedures, promulgate an interim rule immediately, and then engage in a
post hoc rulemaking. This type of rulemaking, which Michael Asimow
calls "interim-final" rulemaking,7 5 resolves the dilemma posed in the
preceding paragraph. One might object that concern about crippling the
72. See, e.g., Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1154, 1173-74 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (finding no unconstitutional prejudgment when an agency head expresses general
views about the merits of an issue in advance of issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking on
that issue), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
73. See 435 U.S. 519, 523-25 (1978) (cautioning lower courts not to impose on
agencies rulemaking procedures not contained in the APA or the agency's organic statute).
74. See infra note 77.
75. See Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L.
REv. 703, 704 (1999) (defining interim-final rules as "rules adopted by federal agencies that
become effective without prior notice and public comment and that invite post-effective
public comment") (emphasis omitted).
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agency's power to act during a rulemaking does not properly count as good
cause for avoiding pre-promulgation notice and comment. However, in
Ford Motor, the FTC tried to act to the same effect-with an interim
announcement (via adjudication) of a general rule while notice and
comment proceeded-and the conventional wisdom is that it should have
been allowed to do so. The only difference is that in Ford Motor the
agency opted for policymaking by adjudication rather than promulgation of
an "interim-final" rule. Why the latter expedient should be considered a
misuse of a procedural tool while the agency's procedural course in Ford
Motor should be considered legitimate (if still undesirable) is unclear.
Ultimately, this analysis tracks a long circle back to Chenery II. As
suggested above, methods exist for agencies to modify both rulemaking
and adjudication to deal with particular regulatory situations. Thus,
assuming no unfair surprise to the regulated party, judicial review of the
agency's choice of one vehicle or the other reduces to examination of the
functional appropriateness of the chosen vehicle.76  But if Chenery II's
deference rule means anything, it must mean that those decisions are for the
agency to make, not the reviewing court. Under Chenery II, the only
restrictions a court can legitimately impose on the agency's choice of
vehicle are those that are compelled by due process (when retroactive
application of an adjudicative result would be fundamentally unfair).
Review for functional appropriateness is inappropriate.
However, Chenery II leaves room for judicial review when the agency
takes steps inconsistent with the policymaking vehicle the agency has itself
already chosen. In such a case, respect for the process the agency itself has
chosen requires judicial scrutiny of the agency's procedural conduct. Patel
falls within this latter justification for judicial review, in that the INS's
action in that case was inconsistent with its initial choice of rulemaking. In
contrast, Ford Motor goes beyond it.
The difference between Patel and Ford Motor reveals the justification
for a judicial rule requiring the agency to use rulemaking. Patel's
requirement that an agency use rulemaking to amend an existing order
dovetails with the rule that regulations are binding on the agency itself.
However, when, as in Ford Motor, there is no extant regulation, the
substantive law prop for the anti-circumvention rule disappears.77 At that
76. See, e.g., First Bancorporation v. Bd. of Governors, 728 F.2d 434, 438 (10th Cir.
1984) (relying on the functional appropriateness of rulemaking to a given regulatory
problem to compel the agency to act by rulemaking); see also Araiza, supra note 7, at 370-
72, 381-87 (discussing courts' reliance on this approach).
77. In this latter case-where there is solely a procedural reason for an anti-
circumvention rule-the Vermont Yankee concern becomes most prevalent. See Vermont
Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 (noting that agencies have discretion in granting additional
procedural rights, which generally reviewing courts cannot impose). By contrast, when a
procedural requirement is necessary to satisfy a substantive rule of administrative law,
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point there is less reason to prohibit the agency from toggling back and
forth between policymaking by rulemaking and policymaking by
adjudication. Such toggling may be bad practice, but unless there is a
separate problem with it, such as unfair surprise, it should remain within
the agency's discretion to respond to regulatory problems as it sees fit.
Under this reasoning, Ford Motor applies an overly aggressive version of
the anti-circumvention principle.
Still, Ford Motor (and, for separate reasons not discussed here, Wyman-
Gordon78) illustrates the potential for agency misuse of this discretion.
There must be some impact on the credibility of the rulemaking process
when, during the pendency of a rulemaking, the agency tips its hand-and
arguably pre-commits itself-by announcing a particular policy in an
adjudication. While courts are understandably loathe to find unfair
prejudgment when an agency embarks on a rulemaking,79 one can
understand how a party would wonder about the meaningfulness of a
rulemaking when the agency had quite possibly already made up its
mind-even as an interim measure. 80  These concerns, if not judicially
cognizable, are real. Ford Motor illustrates those concerns, and thus
highlights a problem in administrative law. Moreover, by pushing the anti-
circumvention principle farther than it could properly go, Ford Motor,
especially when considered in conjunction with Patel, serves a useful
purpose in delineating the proper boundaries of Patel's principle. Thus,
Ford Motor, while ultimately a misfire, both reveals important legal and
policy issues and sharpens our understanding of Patel. For that reason it
deserves at least some credit, even if it must ultimately be rejected.
Vermont Yankee becomes less relevant as precedent. Cf Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653-54 (1990) (stating that Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), suggested that the judicial review provisions of the APA
imposed a "general procedural requirement" that the agency take the necessary steps to
provide an explanation upon which a court could base its judicial review, and distinguishing
Vermont Yankee on that basis) (internal quotation omitted). In our situation, the substantive
rule is the binding nature of a regulation even on the agency itself-a rule that would be
violated if the agency were free effectively to change that rule through means short of a
subsequent rulemaking. This rule is relevant to the situation in Patel, where there is an
extant regulation, but not to the situation in Ford Motor, where there is no such regulation.
78. See Robinson, supra note 71, at 512 (noting and critiquing the NLRB's failure to
use rulemaking).
79. See supra note 72.
80. While private party concern about prejudgment is, of course, impossible to quantify,
it seems reasonable to hypothesize that there might be less concern about prejudgment when
an agency issues an interim regulation. If nothing else, the explicitly interim nature of the
regulation gives the agency an easy way to backtrack gracefully should it conclude, after
notice and comment, that the interim policy was a mistake. Because adjudications do not
carry with them that explicitly interim character, a private party might conceivably believe
the agency to be more committed to that policy, especially when, as in Ford Motor, the
agency was preparing to notify all regulated parties of the result of that adjudication-derived
policy.
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